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Résumé: Nous examinons la performance à long terme des fusions et acquisitions 
dans l’industrie de l’assurance responsabilité. Nous investiguons spécifiquement si 
ces transactions créent de la valeur pour les actionnaires des acquéreurs et évaluons 
comment la gouvernance d’entreprise affecte cette performance. Nos résultats 
montrent que les fusions et acquisitions génèrent des rendements positifs anormaux 
à long terme, soit après trois ans. Même si les offres amicales paraissent plus 
profitables que celles hostiles, l’évidence empirique ne supporte pas la conjecture 
que les transactions domestiques créent davantage de valeur que celles étrangères. 
Nos résultats sont significativement plus élevés pour les acquéreurs habituels et 
dans les pays où les investisseurs sont mieux protégés. Les mécanismes internes de 
gouvernance d’entreprise affectent significativement la performance des acquéreurs. 
 
Mots clés: Fusion et acquisition, assurance responsabilité, gouvernance 
d’entreprise, création de valeur, performance des acquéreurs 
 
JEL Classification: D80, G22 
 
 
Abstract: We examine the long run performance of M&A transactions in the 
property-liability insurance industry. We specifically investigate whether such 
transactions create value for the bidders’ shareholders and assess how corporate 
governance mechanisms affect such performance. Our results show that M&A create 
value in the long run as buy and hold abnormal returns are positive and significant 
after three years. While tender offers appear to be more profitable than mergers, our 
evidence does not support the conjecture that domestic transactions create more 
value than cross border transactions. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly 
higher for frequent acquirers and in countries where investor protection is  better. 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms are also significant determinants of the 
performance of bidders. 
 
Keywords: Merger and acquisition, property-liability insurance, governance, value 
creation, performance of bidders 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade, the insurance industry experienced a large number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) transactions. The economic rationales for these operations include the 
insurers’ will to increase their geographical reach, their products’ range (Amel et al., 2004) and 
benefit from scale and scope economies (Cummins et al., 1999). Furthermore, insurers could 
have initiated these transactions in order to benefit from financial synergies (Chamberlain and 
Tennyson, 1998) or reduce the riskiness and/or improve the amount/timing of their cash flow 
streams (Cummins and Weiss, 2004). 
 
According to Thomson Financial, M&A transactions in the US insurance industry over the 1990-
2001 period account for the third of the transactions worldwide in terms of number (639 
compared to 2101), and for almost 45% in terms of value (218.1$ US billions compared to 
480.8$ US billions). Interestingly, US insurers do not limit their M&A activity to the domestic 
market, and engage more and more often in cross border operations, enhancing a worldwide 
consolidation movement in the insurance industry. Surprisingly, however, few studies focus on 
the value creation of this phenomenon with the exception of Cummins and Weiss (2004) and 
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) that look into the short run market reaction of such transactions.1
The existing financial literature, on the other hand, suggests that M&A transactions may also 
destroy, rather than create, value especially if they are motivated by managerial hubris (Roll, 
1986). As Denis and McConnell (2003, p.4) sustain” managers interested in maximizing the size 
of their business empires can waste corporate resources by overpaying for acquisitions rather 
than returning cash to the shareholders”. Hence a negative impact on the bidders’ firm value 
could be observed. For such behavior to be curbed, effective internal (i.e., firm-level) and 
external (i.e., country level) governance mechanisms, such as (1) a strong board and a 
concentrated ownership, and (2) a legal environment that offers strong protection to minority 
shareholders, need to be put in place. The legal environment relates not only to investor 
protection but also to transparency and overall quality of accounting standards, which have all 
                                                 
1 Akhigbe and Madura (2001) also study the valuation effect of M&A transactions on the acquirers’ shares in the 
insurance industry, but they do not distinguish between within-border and cross-border deals. 
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been recently shown by Rossi and Volpin (2003), and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), to be 
significant determinants of M&A. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature along two ways: First, we go beyond extant studies by 
investigating whether, in the long run, bidders’ shareholders in the insurance industry benefit 
from this M&A phenomenon.2 Second, we examine the impact of firm level and country level 
corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of US property-liability insurers involved 
in intra industry acquisitions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to address this 
issue in such a large governance framework. Indeed, the empirical literature that focused on the 
consequences of M&A transactions in the insurance industry did not attempt to assess the 
importance of cross country and firm level differences in governance structures simultaneously as 
possible explanations of the acquirer’s performance. We specifically seek to answer the following 
questions: (1) to what extent does firm-level corporate governance affect the long term 
performance of acquirers in the US insurance industry? (2) Do cross country differences in the 
legal environment and investor protection affect the long term performance of these acquirers? 
 
Our interest in intra-industry transactions stems from the following two reasons. First, intra-
industry transactions are more likely to generate efficiency gains than diversifying mergers 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2004). Second, studying the performance of US bidders in this type of 
transactions is of particular interest for regulation purposes. As a matter of fact, the European 
Union has issued, since the beginning of the 90’s, a series of directives aimed to create a unique 
European insurance market and make cross-border transactions less costly especially within the 
Union. Simultaneously, while the United States issued the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act in late 1999, 
in order to reduce the restrictions on banking activities, insurance companies were not concerned 
and cross-border transactions were not made any easier for them. In this context, any evidence 
suggesting that cross-border transactions may actually create value for US acquirers would lead 
us to assert that American regulators should follow the example of their European counterparts 
and put in place some kind of regulation that facilitates and encourages cross border intra-
industry transactions.  
 
                                                 
2 As sustained by Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2004), the focus on a particular industry also sheds light on the 
sources of the wealth gains in M&A transactions (p. 198). 
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Within intra-industry transactions, we choose to focus on acquisitions made by property-liability 
insurers. Indeed, during the 90’s there was a heavy M&A activity in this industry and we think it 
is worth exploring the financial consequences of this consolidation movement. Furthermore, as 
suggested by Cummins and Weiss (2000), the changing industry structure that results from the 
recent waves of M&A and its impact on the performance of bidders in general, is an under-
researched area and calls for a particular attention. Specifically, they suggest as a promising area 
for future research to focus on the effects of consolidation on performance and efficiency in the 
property-liability insurance industry due to both their theoretical and regulatory implications, and 
to analyze the impact of board composition and other aspects of corporate governance on 
performance and efficiency in the insurance industry. Our paper fills this void in the literature.  
 
Interestingly, over the 1995-2000 period, foreign transactions made by US property-liability 
insurers represent only 12% of the total number of transactions they realized (see Figure 1 for a 
distribution of these cross border transactions). The infrequency of such deals is puzzling since 
no explicit regulation prohibits insurers from making acquisitions abroad. We hypothesize that 
either (1) cross border transactions offer no gain for the acquiring insurer in this industry, (2) or 
investor protection barriers such as inefficient legal infrastructures in the target home country 
make such transactions difficult to implement.3
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
The main innovation of this paper is to relate corporate governance (both external and internal) 
using a large array of measures, to the long run performance of US property-insurance-acquirers. 
Using a sample of 177 transactions made by US insurers, out of which 30 involve a foreign 
target, and for which we document extensive coverage of corporate governance variables, we 
show that M&A indeed create value in the long run: buy and hold abnormal returns are positive 
and significant after three years. Our evidence suggests that tender offers are more profitable than 
mergers but provides no support for the conjecture that domestic transactions perform better than 
their cross border counterparts. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent 
                                                 
3 Using macroeconomic data, Buch and Delong (2004) report evidence showing that cross-border transactions in the 
banking industry are more likely to occur between two countries sharing the same language and legal system, and 
which are geographically close.  
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acquirers and in countries where investor protection is more important (i.e., where legal rules 
exist and are enforced). Internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence 
and turnover, and CEO share ownership, are also significant determinants of the long run positive 
performance of bidders. Specifically, once we control for the board size, higher independence of 
the board leads to a better performance in the long run for the bidder. This result shows that board 
independence improves the bidder’s long term performance once the number of independent 
directors is sufficient to make a difference. On the other hand, as expected, the percentage of 
newly nominated directors (i.e., Board turnover) shows a positive and significant coefficient in 
all specifications. Finally, our evidence shows that the more shares the CEO holds, the lower the 
value creation for the bidders’ shareholders over the long run. This result is consistent with 
arguments from the agency theory on managers’ entrenchment of CEO ownership (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first, we review the literature on M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry. In section 2, we identify and discuss potential determinants 
of the long run performance of acquirers, related to internal and external governance 
mechanisms. In section 3, we describe our sample, and in sections 4 and 5 we discuss our 
empirical findings from the univariate and multivariate analysis respectively. We then conclude 
in section 6. 
 
1. M&A TRANSACTIONS IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Common sense dictates that bidders initiate M&A transactions only if they create value for their 
shareholders. Thus, studying the impact of such deals on the bidder’s performance is of particular 
interest, especially for intra-industry transactions because these are the most likely to be driven 
by synergies, and hence create value. Few empirical papers investigate whether M&A 
transactions are value enhancing in the insurance industry, although insurers are quite active in 
the consolidation process.  
 
The available empirical research shows that US acquiring insurers experience a greater efficiency 
and a higher profitability three year after the M&A (Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss, 1999; 
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Cummins and Xie, 2006).4 The reported findings also suggest that such deals lead to a significant 
positive valuation effect for the acquiring insurers. Indeed, Akhibe and Madura (2001) report a 
positive and significant abnormal return for acquiring insurers and conclude that this favorable 
valuation effect is driven by the similarity of services provided by both the acquirers and the 
acquired. In other words, the somewhat standardization in their products makes the merger of 
operations, for both parties, easier. Interestingly, Akhibe and Madura (2001) document a higher 
positive and significant market reaction for acquirers who are “non-life insurers”. Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001) also report a positive and significant valuation effect for the bidder following 
M&A transactions involving pure insurance partners. This market valuation is positive but 
slightly lower when the target firm is publicly traded. However, only transactions involving 
insurers buying insurers seem to create value for the bidder. Indeed, Cummins and Weiss (2004) 
report a small negative valuation effect on the bidder’s shares following transactions that do not 
involve pure insurance partners. Based on these empirical findings, we can enunciate our first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: M&A transactions involving only insurers should create value for the US 
acquiring insurer in the property-liability industry. 
 
Additionally, cross-border transactions may generate a higher positive valuation effect for the 
bidder because they are perceived to lead to a geographic expansion of its market. Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001) results support this argument. According to their findings, transactions 
involving insurance partners that are both located in the European Union are not welcomed by the 
financial market.  
 
Cross border transactions can also destroy value for the bidder because they are more difficult to 
manage. According to Cummins and Weiss (2004, p.11), “M&A also may reduce value to the 
extent that firms are not very successful in conducting post-merger integration. Post merger 
integration is likely to be especially difficult for cross-country and cross industry mergers due to 
larger national and corporate cultural differences that must be overcome.” Cummins and Weiss 
                                                 
4 Cummins and Rubio-Mises (2003) also report evidence suggesting that Spanish insurers benefit from efficiency 
gains following M&A transactions.  
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(2004) however fail to report evidence supporting this argument. On the contrary, their results 
suggest that domestic transactions destroy value while cross border transactions are value neutral 
for acquirers. Additionally, bidders generally have to pay higher premiums in cross border 
transactions, which may translate into negative wealth gains for them. Rossi and Volpin (2003) 
report evidence supporting this argument, as bidders are found to pay on average a 3% higher 
premium in cross-border transactions. Kiymaz (2004) reports positive and significant cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for US financial institutions involved in cross border M&A operations 
during the days surrounding the announcement of such transactions. However, the positive CARs 
are not significant for the sub-sample of US insurers acquiring international targets. 
 
Overall, there is no general agreement in the extant literature, on whether cross border 
transactions create (Floreani and Rigamonti, 2001), do not create or destroy value (Cummins and 
Weiss, 2004) for acquiring insurers. Hence, we enunciate our second hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cross border transactions are expected to perform differently than within border 
transactions for the US acquirers in the property-liability insurance industry. 
 
Although our paper considers only pure insurance transactions, we do not limit our analysis to 
transactions where the target and the bidder have identical activities. To gauge the potential 
benefit for acquirers of diversifying transactions (diversifying transactions correspond to deals 
where the acquirer and the target have different four digits SIC codes) and focusing transactions 
(focusing transactions correspond to deals where the acquirer and the target have identical four 
digits SIC codes), we control in all our analysis for the type of deal.  
 
The proponents of diversifying transactions argue that the latter allow the acquiring insurer to 
benefit from economies of scope and scale through the joint use of customer databases, 
managerial expertise and brand name. In addition, diversifying transactions are expected to 
reduce the acquirer’s risk because they allow him to operate in a broader range of insurance lines. 
Estrella (2001) findings invalidate however the risk reduction argument. Indeed, his results show 
that the median failure probability resulting from combinations of two property-casualty firms is 
lower than those resulting from a combination of a property-casualty firm with a bank holding 
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company or a life insurer. Also, the percentage of combinations that result in a lower failure 
probability for both parties is more important in the case of pure property-casualty transactions 
compared to transactions where a property-casualty insurer buys a life insurer. Overall, Estrella 
(2001) findings suggest that diversifying transactions do not lead to a risk reduction for the 
property-casualty insurers. 
 
In contrast, the proponents of focusing transactions argue that insurers are better off when they 
focus on their core business. Furthermore, these transactions are less likely to be initiated by 
managers wishing to protect their human capital or increase their private benefits (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986). Berger et al. (2004) show that diversifying transactions are beneficial 
for some types of insurers while focusing transactions are beneficial for other types. Overall, their 
results suggest that every insurer can benefit from M&A as long as he chooses the appropriate 
strategy in his transactions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: M&A focusing transactions should, ceteris paribus, create more value for the US 
acquiring insurer than diversifying transactions. 
 
2. POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LONG RUN PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRERS 
A. Cross country differences 
 
The financial literature is replete of papers investigating the consequences of M&A transactions 
and the factors affecting the performance of the participating partners. However, these studies 
focus mainly on industrial firms or banks, and just few of them pay attention to the insurance 
industry, with the notable exception of Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999), Akhigbe and 
Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) Cummins and Weiss (2004) and more recently 
Cummins and Xie (2006). 
 
Also, only Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) and Cummins and Weiss (2004) investigate the wealth 
gains of insurers in an international setting. Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) propose a model to 
explain the observed abnormal returns for the acquiring insurer, but do not include variables 
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controlling for cross country differences despite available evidence that suggests otherwise.5 For 
example, previous research by Rossi and Volpin (2003) suggest that differences in laws 
protecting shareholders interests and accounting standards across countries do affect the volume 
and characteristics of mergers and acquisition transactions. Their results also suggest that, in 
cross border transactions, the acquiring firms usually come from countries offering higher 
investor protection than the targets’. Additionally, hostile deals are relatively more likely in 
countries with better shareholder protection, suggesting that good protection for minority 
shareholders makes control more contestable by reducing the private benefits of control. Kiymaz 
(2004) also shows that US financial institutions earn higher returns by acquiring targets in 
countries with effective government and public institutions. Hence, following Rossi and Volpin 
(2003) and Kiymaz’s findings, we enunciate our fourth hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Bidders’ post acquisition performance is likely to be affected by its internal 
corporate governance characteristics and the target’s home country governance structure. 
 
Accordingly, we control for differences in the institutional environments by considering variables 
that describe the extent of investor protection, namely: law and order, contract enforcement, the 
legal system, and the extent of perceived corruption. All these indices are derived from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), 
and from ICRG (International Country Risk Guide). To capture different aspects of law 
enforcement, we use the degree of contract enforcement (EC) in the target’s country and we 
construct an index of investor protection that equals the sum of law and order, enforcement of 
contracts, and an inverse measure of corruption (INDEX). Higher values of (INDEX) correspond to a 
legal environment that offers a better protection for shareholders. We expect therefore 
acquisitions to be more value enhancing in environments where investors are more protected. 
 
                                                 
5 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) include the bidder’s size, the relative value of the deal, the method of payment, the 
geographic location of the target and the bidder as well as dummy indicating the industry in which the partners 
operate as explanatory variables of the observed market reaction.  
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B. Firm level corporate governance characteristics 
 
Previous studies show that corporate governance at the firm level has an impact on the post-
acquisition performance of bidders. Therefore, we control for the bidder’s governance 
characteristics including its ownership structure. Namely, we include variables related to the 
percentage of shares held by the CEO (%CEO), institutions (%INST), and block-holders 
(%BLOCK). We expect performance to be better, ceteris paribus, the larger the percentage of 
shares held by the CEO, institutions and block-holders, since agency conflicts are decreased in 
the presence of these stakeholders, and since participation by institutions and block-holders acts 
as a disciplinary device. On the other hand, these variables could be negatively related to the post 
acquisition performance if the important shareholding (especially by the CEO) results in an 
entrenchment problem. Indeed, beyond a certain threshold, CEOs and major block-holders 
become entrenched and pursue their personal objectives rather than maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. Consequently, as long as the shareholding of these entities does not lead to an 
entrenchment problem, the coefficients of these variables are expected to be positive. 
 
Within internal corporate governance mechanisms, we also assess the impact of the Board 
characteristics on the long run performance of acquirers. Boards of directors are generally 
believed to play a significant role in corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Governance 
scholars also emphasize the distinctive contribution of outside directors that are active monitors 
of managers in order to ensure that they act in the interest of shareholders, and other stockholders 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jeansen, 1983). These outside directors are shown to influence very 
important decisions in the firm such as CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988) and negotiation of tender 
offer bids (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Accordingly, we include the proportion of independent 
directors within the board (Vicknair et al, 1993) as an explanatory variable of the bidder’s post 
acquisition performance (%INDD). We additionally use the percentage of new nominees on the 
board (%RENEW).6 Boards that renew regularly their members are less likely to suffer from 
directors’ entrenchment problems, and should exercise a better monitoring on the firm’s top 
management. We expect these proxies for decreased agency conflicts and for a higher 
transparency to be positively related to post-acquisition performance. 
                                                 
6 Here, a new nominee is defined as a director who is nominated for the first time in the board of directors. 
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 Finally, we consider the CEO tenure (TENURE CEO, a proxy for his experience), and the CEO 
independence from the chief of the board position (INDCEO) as explanatory variables of the long 
run performance of acquirers. Several studies document that performance is higher when the 
transaction is conducted by an experienced CEO and when conflicts of interests are lower, hence 
when the CEO does not head the board of directors (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
 
C. Deal characteristics 
 
In order to test the impact of the deal characteristics on the bidder’s long run post-acquisition 
performance, we also include the following control variables: 
 
Mode of acquisition (Merger or tender offers): We include a dummy variable (MERGER) that 
equals one if the transaction is a merger, zero otherwise. In the M&A literature, takeovers are 
considered to be more costly to acquirers but are more likely to be disciplinary. Although 
takeovers are more rewarding to targets, little is known for certain about the impact of the mode 
of transaction on bidders’ long run performance. Hence, we provide no directional expectation on 
the sign of this variable and leave this issue to be resolved empirically. 
 
Percentage of shares acquired: Transactions where the bidder obtains the control of the target are 
more likely to create value because they offer more flexibility for the bidder to impose its way of 
doing business. Also, these transactions are more likely to be disciplinary. Therefore, we control 
for whether the transaction led to a change in control or not7, and for the ownership structure of 
the bidder. Namely, we include a variable related to the percentage of shares acquired (%ACQ), 
and we expect it to have a positive coefficient. 
 
Target’s origin: Considering whether the target is domestic or foreign allows us to test our second 
hypothesis. We include a dummy variable (FOREIGN) that equals one if the target is foreign, zero 
                                                 
7 Since change of control is highly correlated to the percentage acquired, we do not use both of these variables 
simultaneously. The variable percentage acquired thus captures the change of control during the transaction. The 
results remain unchanged whether we use one or the other. 
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otherwise. As discussed earlier, we do not offer any directional expectation concerning the sign 
of its coefficient.  
 
Target relative Size: The relative size of the target with respect to the bidder is also shown to be a 
relevant determinant of the bidder’s post acquisition performance. Large targets are more difficult 
to incorporate into the bidder’s activities. Ideally, we should use the value of the target’s total 
assets, its net sales or its market capitalization reported to the bidder’s one as a measure of 
relative size. Unfortunately, these variables are available only for few targets and their inclusion 
in the regressions would cause a dramatic decrease in our sample size. To overcome this problem, 
we use a dummy variable (AGENCY) that equals one if the target is an insurance agency or broker 
zero otherwise since insurance agencies/brokers have a small size compared to the bidder’s size 
(recall that bidders are public companies and are consequently obliged to have a minimum size in 
order to be publicly traded). AGENCY is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
 
Type of transaction: This variable allows us to gauge the potential benefits of focusing versus 
diversifying transactions, and to test our third hypothesis. We include a dummy (FOCUS) equals 
one if the target and the bidder have identical four digits SIC codes, zero otherwise. The literature 
is generally divided as to whether it is more beneficial for acquirers to focus on their activities or 
to diversify them, as previously discussed. However, the evidence reported for the financial 
industry and more particularly for the insurance sector suggests that focusing transactions create 
more value for these types of acquirers. Consequently, we expect this variable to have a positive 
coefficient.  
 
Type of bidder: Frequent acquirers are more likely to perform better since they have the 
necessary experience to conduct post-merger integration of the target’s activities. Frequent M&A 
transactions also signal to investors that acquirers are expanding and having good future 
prospects which should be rewarded by the market. In order to control for this argument, we 
include a variable measuring the number of M&A transactions conducted by the bidder during 
the year of acquisition (FREQA), and expect it to have a positive coefficient. 
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3. DATA AND SAMPLE  
A. The Mergers and Acquisitions data 
 
Our initial database contains all mergers and acquisition transactions concerning financial 
companies announced between January 1995 and December 2000 with a completed status and 
reported by SDC, a database from Thompson Financial.8 Because we wish to study the factors 
affecting the performance of US property-liability insurers following an M&A, we kept only 
transactions where the bidder is US and belongs to this industry. Also, our study focuses on intra-
industry M&A between different companies which made us drop 75 observations where the 
target is not an insurer and 50 observations corresponding to buybacks. We also eliminate 10 
observations because the percentage of shares acquired is less than 10% and 23 observations 
because they correspond to the acquisition of an undisclosed minority stake. Our intermediate 
sample consists in 604 M&A transactions where the bidder is a US property-liability insurer and 
the target is also an insurer. Once we gather variables related to internal corporate governance, 
we end up with a final sample of 177 transactions, out of which 30 are cross-border. In order to 
compute the firm’s long run performance, we calculate buy and hold returns (raw and adjusted) 
as in Floreani and Rigamonti (2001). Returns are drawn from CRSP. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, most targets come from the UK, followed by other European 
countries, Northern America, and Latin America. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 provides an exhaustive description of our dataset characteristics. First, we note that most 
transactions in the sample are tender offers (the average number of mergers is less than 10%). We 
also note that the sample is largely composed of domestic acquisitions. Indeed, only 17% of the 
transactions involve targets located in foreign countries. Interestingly, 50% of the sample 
                                                 
8 These transactions were all completed by late before December 2002. 
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includes transactions that involve partners in the same four digit code industry. These figures 
show that US insurers engage more often in industrial rather than geographical diversification.  
 
The vast majority of transactions involve a change of control, and the mean percentage acquired 
is 95%. For a small subset of firms, we were able to gather figures on the deal value and the 
method of payment. These figures show that most transactions are paid in cash, especially when 
they involve foreign targets. In fact, all foreign transactions are tender offers that are paid in cash. 
Evidence in Rossi and Volpin (2004) shows that the probability of an all cash-bid decreases with 
the degree of investor protection in the home country of the acquirer. This in turn indicates that 
acquisitions paid in stock, require a friendlier investor protection environment. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 also shows that board of directors in acquiring firms are, on average, 
composed of 11 members, out of which 5 are independent, and one is newly nominated. In half of 
the sample, the CEO is not independent and acts as both the CEO and the chief of the board. We 
also note that block-holders own on average 25% of the shares compared to 17.36% held by 
institutions and 6.5% held by the CEO. The CEO has an average tenure of 9 years and is in his 
mid-fifties. 
 
Panel C of Table 2 shows that the vast majority of the target countries have a common legal 
origin (only 8.5% of the targets’ home countries have a civil legal origin). This is likely due to 
the fact that most transactions are domestic (147 out of 177 involve US targets). 
 
4. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
A. Long run performance 
 
We compute our long run returns on an unadjusted and an adjusted base. To compute market 
adjusted returns, we substract from the acquirer’s three-year buy-and-hold returns, the 
corresponding three-year buy and hold return of the S&P500 index.  
 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 3 show that acquirers in our sample exhibit a positive 
mean buy-and hold performance over three years of 0.842. Once adjusted for the market returns, 
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the firms show a positive overperformance of 0.573. Our first hypothesis is therefore verified. 
This result is consistent with the evidence documented by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) who 
find that bidders’ shareholders earn significant positive returns following M&A transactions in 
the insurance industry. It also supports the greater efficiency and higher profitability reported by 
acquiring insurers three year after the M&A documented by Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss 
(1999) and more recently by Cummins and Xie (2006).9 Interestingly, our findings contrast with 
evidence on cross-industry long run performance of M&A documented by Loughran and Vijh 
(1997), Rau and Vermalen (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). Indeed these studies 
document for their full samples, that exclude financial institutions and insurance companies, 
small and often not statistically significant estimates of long term price performance. Our finding 
of long run over-performance for M&A in the insurance industry is thus industry-specific.  
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
Furthermore, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) show that the positive valuation effect is more 
important for cross-border transactions when the bidder is located in the EU. According to the 
results reported in Panel B of Table 3, cross border transactions yield lower mean adjusted 
returns (although positive) than domestic transactions (0.285 and 0.631, respectively). The 
difference between both sub samples is significant at the 5% level. Our second hypothesis 
arguing that the performance of cross border and domestic transactions should be different is thus 
supported. However, this result is weakly supported if we compare the sub-sample medians 
(0.264 and 0.547, respectively with a p-value of median difference equals to 0.108). Cross-border 
transactions, argue Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), may generate a higher positive valuation 
effect for the bidder because they are perceived to lead to a geographic expansion of its market. 
But, as noted by Cummins and Weiss (2004), M&A may also reduce value to the extent that 
firms are not very successful in conducting post-merger integration, especially in cross border 
transactions as compared to pure domestic transactions. Our evidence supports weakly the 
Cummins and Weiss (2004) suggestion. 
                                                 
9 In order to check the robustness of our findings, we also calculate for firms in our sample with available operational 
data, the combined ratio variation between the last fiscal year proceeding the one in which the transaction was 
announced, to 3 years following the announcement. The combined ratio is traditionally used by insurer to indicate 
the profitability of their operations. It is calculated as the sum of the expense and the loss ratios. Our results indicate 
that, on average, the insurers’ underwriting result increases by 5 cents of a dollar three years after a M&A. 
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 Panel C of Table 3 reports the bidder’s long run performance by type of transaction. The results 
suggest that acquirers are better off when focusing on their core business which supports our 
third hypothesis. Indeed, focusing transactions yield higher mean and median raw and adjusted 
returns (The mean and median BHAR for focusing transactions are 0.763 and 0.826 respectively 
compared to 0.371 and 0.332 for diversifying transactions). The difference between both sub 
samples is significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the results reported in Panel B and C suggest 
that diversification (at the industry or geographical level) is not beneficial for US insurers in the 
property liability industry. 
 
B. Characteristics of acquirers with foreign transactions 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports univariate results for cross border versus domestic transactions. 
According to Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) who compare stock price and operating 
performance across cross-border and domestic transactions, bidders earn significantly less returns 
and perform more poorly when targets are foreign.  We first note that all transactions with foreign 
targets are tender offers (and paid in cash). In domestic transactions, 88% are tender offers. We 
also document that frequent acquirers that have a larger average number of transactions per year 
are more likely to buy domestic targets (average of 7 transactions per year). On average, the 
acquired percentage in domestic transactions is significantly higher (at the 5% level) than in 
foreign transactions (96.38% versus 88%), but both types of transactions involve a change in 
control. Within foreign target countries, 50% have a civil legal origin. 
 
Turning to internal governance variables, we document that acquirers of foreign targets have 
significantly (at the 1% level) larger boards than acquirers involved in domestic transactions 
(14.4 and 10.46 respectively). The percentage of shares held by block-holders and by institutions 
is significantly (at the 5% level) higher in acquirers of domestic targets. This result suggests that 
these stakeholders are more heavily involved in domestic transactions that are free from political 
risk considerations inherent to cross border transactions. 
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Furthermore, we document that CEO tenure is almost twice longer in transactions that involve 
foreign targets, suggesting that this type of transaction calls for a larger experience of the CEO. 
The percentage of shares held by the CEO is not significantly different in cross-border versus 
domestic acquisitions, but we find that a change of CEO occurs significantly more often in 
domestic transactions. 
 
C. Characteristics of acquirers with focusing transactions 
 
Panel B of Table 4 reports univariate results for focusing versus diversifying transactions. 95.6% 
of the focusing transactions involve a target from a country with a civil law origin compared to 
87.2% for diversifying transactions. A possible explanation is that focusing transactions in less 
protective environments are less costly to acquirers than diversifying transactions that may be 
more uncertain to exploit. Interestingly, acquirers that have a larger average number of 
transactions per year engage more actively in focusing transactions (average of 7.758 transactions 
compared to 4.558 and the difference is significant at the 1% level). Furthermore, insurers 
involved in diversifying transactions have the same board size and turnover as the ones involved 
in focusing transactions but are slightly more independent (the mean percentage of independent 
directors is 45.7% for diversifying transactions compared to 40.3% for focusing transactions with 
a significant mean difference at the 10%). 
 
We also note that the percentage of shares held by block-holders and by institutions is 
significantly (at the 5% and 10% level respectively) higher for acquirers involved in diversifying 
transactions. This result suggests that these stakeholders encourage insurers to diversify their 
activities by entering new market sectors and may be provide the required assistance for such 
diversification. Finally, the results reported in Panel B of Table 4 show that diversifying 
transactions are initiated by more experienced CEOs (the mean tenure of the CEO is 10.19 years 
in diversifying transactions compared to 6.44 years in focusing transactions). This finding 
suggests that CEOs wait till they get a solid position in the property liability insurance industry 
before entering new insurance segments. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
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 5. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
In our multivariate analysis, we consider the following general model: 
 
BHAR = F (Deal Characteristics, Internal Corporate Governance, External Governance). 
 
Where Deal characteristics refers to the percentage of shares acquired (%ACQ), the mode of 
acquisition (MERGER), the target’s origin (FOREIGN), 10 the type of bidder (FREQA), the type of 
transaction (FOCUS) and the target’s relative size (AGENCY). Internal corporate governance refers 
to the ownership structure of the acquirer (%INST, %BLOCK), the BOD characteristics (%INDD, 
%RENEW), and the CEO characteristics (%CEO, INDCEO, TENURE CEO). Finally, external 
governance refers to the degree of contract enforcement (EC) and the level of investor protection 
in the country (INDEX). Table 5 reports several specifications of our general model. Table 6 
provides a description of our variables. 
 
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
 
The first specification that appears in Table 5 is our basic model and controls only for the deal 
characteristics. Specifications (2) and (3) introduce our two measures of investor protection. We 
control in specifications (4) and (5) for block-holders’ ownership stake and the board 
characteristics. Specifications (6) and (7), instead, control for institutional ownership and board 
characteristics. The two last specifications introduce CEO characteristics.11  
 
Our findings go as follows: In all specifications, the percentage acquired (%ACQ) is never 
significant.12 However, the dummy variable (MERGER) shows that higher returns are obtained for 
tender offers. The coefficient of the variable is consistently negative and highly significant (at the 
                                                 
10 Recall that all foreign transactions are tender offers and that they are all paid in cash. The variable Foreign is thus 
likely to largely capture the method of payment. 
11 Some specifications with all variables together were impossible to run due to problems of correlations. 
12 Note that the percentage acquired and the percentage before the transaction are highly correlated (0.96). Thus, we 
use the percentage acquired in all specifications. However, the results remain the same if we use the percentage 
before the transaction instead. 
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5% level) confirming the conjecture that mergers are less beneficial to acquirers. Similarly, once 
we control for frequent acquisitions (FREQA), we obtain a positive and highly significant 
coefficient (at the 1% level) indicating that frequent acquirers exhibit higher returns in the long 
run. This result suggests that bidders involved in several acquisitions acquire the necessary 
experience to integrate successfully the target’s activities into their own businesses. 
 
The dummy (FOREIGN) is consistently negative suggesting that returns to the bidders’ 
shareholders are higher for domestic transactions, but its coefficient is significant  in only one out 
of the nine specifications we consider. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is not supported and 
we can not conclude that cross border transactions perform differently from the domestic ones. In 
unreported results we investigate whether some specific foreign transactions lead to a significant 
different performance for the bidder namely: (1) Transactions where the geographic 
diversification is accompanied by an industry diversification, (2) Foreign transaction involving 
targets from the European Union. Our empirical findings suggest that these two types of foreign 
acquisitions do not have any significant impact on the bidder’s performance since both variables 
have systematically insignificant coefficients. 
 
Furthermore, as previously discussed in the description of our third hypothesis, focusing 
transactions are expected to generate more gains for the acquiring insurers. The introduction of 
(FOCUS) in all specifications of Table 5 never yields a significant coefficient.13 As for our proxy 
for relative size, (AGENCY), it fails to exhibit any significance in any of our models. 
 
In specification (2) and (3), we introduce our proxies for investor protection, namely enforcement 
of contracts (EC) and the composite index of investor protection (INDEX). Both variables exhibit 
positive and significant coefficients (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively). This result confirms 
evidence in Rossi and Volpin (2001) who document that the level of shareholder protection is a 
                                                 
13 We do not control for the method of payment since previous findings reported in Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and 
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) show that this variable has no explanatory power of the acquirers’ returns in the 
insurance industry. Its effect is indirectly captured as previously explained by the dummy foreign. 
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significant determinant of the method of payment, the frequency of hostile takeovers, the 
premium and the volume of transactions.14
 
When we introduce board characteristics, in specifications (4) to (9), we obtain systematically 
highly significant coefficients for board independence (%IND) and board turnover (%Renew). 
Specifically, the percentage of independent directors is consistently negatively and significantly 
(at the 1% level) related to long run performance. This result is puzzling since independence of 
the board is commonly considered as a proxy for more transparency and less agency conflicts 
among members of the board. 
 
In an attempt to find an explanation for this result, we take a closer look at the data, and note that, 
over our study period, several companies have small boards with few or no independent directors 
(e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Inc) while others have large boards with important shares of 
independent directors (e.g., Saint Paul Companies). Therefore, we introduce an interaction 
variable (unreported here) for the % of independent directors that controls for the board size (i.e., 
%INDD*BODSZ). The coefficients of our variables remain remarkably constant and the interaction 
variable %IND*BODsz exhibits a positive and significant coefficient. Thus, once we control for 
the board size, higher independence of the board leads to a better performance in the long run for 
the bidder. This result shows that board independence improves the bidder’s long term 
performance once the number of independent directors is sufficient to make a difference. 
 
On the other hand, as expected, the percentage of newly nominated directors (%RENEW) on the 
board shows a positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% level) in all specifications. This 
finding suggests that boards that renew constantly their members are more beneficial to 
shareholders. As for the acquirers’ ownership structure, we find that institutional ownership is not 
a significant determinant of the long run performance of acquirers, while block-holders’ 
ownership seems negatively and significantly (at the 5% level) related to performance. This runs 
against arguments from the agency theory on the disciplinary role of block-holders. In order to 
                                                 
14 Since some studies stress the differences of shareholder protection between countries, we consider, in addition to 
the Enforcement of contracts indicator and our composite investor protection index, the difference in institutional 
environments between the target and the home country. Our results remain qualitatively the same. They are available 
upon request.  
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investigate further this finding, we rerun specification (4) and (5) by replacing the percentage of 
shares held by block-holders with the difference between the percentage they hold and (1) the 
percentage of shares held by institutions (WEDGE1) and (2) the percentage of shares held by the 
CEO (WEDGE2). Interestingly, WEDGE1 and WEDGE2 exhibit negative and significant 
coefficients suggesting that block-holders’ shareholdings is associated with a decrease in the 
bidder’s post acquisition performance only when they do not belong to the bidder’s management 
nor to the financial industry. 
 
In specifications (8) and (9), we introduce variables related to the CEO characteristics, namely 
independence of the CEO from the chief of the board position, his tenure as CEO and the % of 
shares he holds. We document in this third set of regressions that the percentage of shares held by 
the CEO is significantly (at the 1% level) and negatively related to the bidder’s long run 
performance. Hence, the more shares the CEO holds and the lower the value creation for the 
bidders’ shareholders over the long run. This result is consistent with arguments from the agency 
theory on managers’ entrenchment of CEO ownership (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
 
INDCEO, our proxy for CEO (in)dependence and TENURE CEO, our proxy for the CEO 
experience have positive but insignificant coefficients at a conventional level. These findings 
suggest that independent and experienced CEOs are not more successful in conducting M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry. 
 
D. Robustness Checks 
 
Thus far, our empirical findings suggest that shareholders of US insurers in the property liability 
industry benefit from mergers and acquisitions in the long run. Also bidders who make multiple 
acquisitions in the same year seem to report a higher performance. However, the improvement in 
the bidder’s performance over the three years window we consider could result from subsequent 
transactions realized by the bidder over this window. In such a case, the variable (FREQA) may 
capture this effect since bidders who make multiple acquisitions are usually engaged in a M&A 
program that lasts for more than one year. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we 
include in specifications (1) to (9) reported in Table 5 a dummy variable (SUBSEQUENT) that 
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equals one if the bidder makes a merger or acquisition during the three years following the event 
year, and zero otherwise. The information required to construct this variable is hand collected 
from proxy statements. Our results are reported in Table 7. Overall, our results and conclusions 
remain unchanged. Interestingly, SUBSEQUENT has a positive but insignificant coefficient in all of 
nine specifications suggesting that it is the number of transactions realized during the year, and 
not the ones conducted subsequently that improve the bidder’s performance.  
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
Furthermore, merger and acquisition transactions could lead to a change in the management of 
the acquiring company (especially in the case of a merger). Accordingly, the abnormal positive 
performance reported for the bidder could result from the higher skills of the new manager 
instead of the acquisition itself. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we construct a 
dummy variable (CEO CHANGE) that controls for CEO Turnover around the transaction and add it 
to specifications (4) to (9). Our results are reported in Table 8. 
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
Our results and conclusions remain unchanged. CEOCHANGE has a consistently negative 
coefficient but it is never significant. Accordingly, a change in the bidder’s top management does 
not seem to affect its post acquisition performance. 
 
We also conduct some additional tests in order to check the robustness of our findings. First, we 
use instead of the %BLOCK and %INST, the corresponding number of stake-holders (#BLOCK and 
#INST) as well as the number of non insider block holders (# NON INSIDER BLOCK). The results are 
reported in Table 9. Overall, our conclusions remain unchanged. Interestingly, the coefficient of # 
NON INSIDER BLOCK and #INST are positive which suggests that the presence of multiple non insider 
block holders and institutions is beneficial for the bidders’ shareholders. Unfortunately, the 
insignificance of these variables’ coefficients does not provide support for this conclusion. 
Second, we re-run specifications (1) to (9) while controlling for the type of target, private or 
public by adding a dummy variable (PUBLIC) that equals one if the target is public, zero 
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otherwise. The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient of PUBLIC is never significant at 
all. The other coefficients in the models remain remarkably stable. 
 
(Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here) 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper assesses the long run performance of acquiring firms in the property liability industry 
and investigates the impact of internal and external governance characteristics on the observed 
post acquisition performance. 
 
Although the literature has largely examined the impact of M&A on short run performance and 
market reaction of bidders at the announcement, very few studies examined whether these 
transactions indeed create wealth in the long run. 
 
We show, with a sample of 177 transactions, out of which 30 involve foreign targets, that they 
indeed lead to positive and significant unadjusted and market adjusted buy and hold returns over 
three years following the transaction. Furthermore, tender offers appear to be more profitable 
than mergers, and positive returns are significantly higher for frequent acquirers and in countries 
where investor protection is better (i.e., where legal rules exist and are enforced). Foreign 
acquisitions do not have a significant impact on the bidder’s performance even when they involve 
a geographical diversification or a target from the European Union.  
 
Once we introduce internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence and 
turnover, we find that these variables affect the long run positive performance of bidders. We also 
show that CEO ownership has a negative impact which is consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis. Finally, as expected, the legal environment and the extent of shareholder protection 
determine the extent of buy and hold abnormal returns in the long run, as transactions in more 
protective environments seem to yield a better performance. 
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 FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CROSS BORDER TRANSACTIONS MADE BY US PROPERTY LIABILITY 
INSURERS OVER THE 1995-2000 PERIOD BY TARGET’S ORIGIN 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
Europe (excluding UK) America (excluding US) Asia and Oceania UK Africa
 25
TABLE 1- DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRANSACTIONS BY TARGET NATION 
Table 1 reports the number of transactions by target country for the sample of 177 M&A transactions by US property-liability US 
insurance over the period 1995-2000. 
 
Target nation Number of transactions 
 
Argentina 1 
Australia 2 
Bermuda 2 
Brazil 3 
Canada 2 
Colombia 1 
Denmark 1 
Egypt 1 
Finland 1 
France 2 
Hong Kong 1 
Indonesia 1 
Israel 1 
Mexico 2 
Spain 2 
UK 7 
Total Foreign 30 
Total Domestic (US) 147 
Total Sample 177 
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TABLE 2- DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the sample of acquirers in the property-liability insurance over the period 1995 to 2000. 
Panel A describes the deal characteristics; Panel B describes the acquirer’s internal governance characteristics, while Panel C 
reports statistics on the legal environment of target countries. For each variable, the table provides the number of observations, the 
mean, the median and the standard deviation. For a detailed description of the variables, please refer to Table 6. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Panel A- Deal Characteristics 
FOREIGN 177 0.169 0.000 0.376 
MERGER 177 0.096 0.000 0.295 
FOCUS 177 0.514 1.000 0.501 
CASH 35 1.000 1.000 0.000 
STOCK  14 1.000 1.000 0.000 
MIX 9 1.000 1.000 0.000 
%ACQ 177 94.961 100.000 15.870 
CONTROL 177 0.938 1.000 0.242 
DEAL VALUE  53 1115.205 84.500 3899.189 
PUBLIC  177 0.135 0.000 0.343 
AGENCY  177 0.542 1.000 0.500 
Panel B- Acquirers ’internal governance characteristics 
BODSZ 177 11.130 11.000 3.024 
%INDD 177 0.430 0.364 0.187 
INDCEO 177 0.576 1.000 0.495 
%NEWNOM 177 0.661 0.583 0.314 
%RENEW 177 0.095 0.083 0.115 
%CEO (IN %) 177 6.536 1.050 12.378 
%BLOCK (IN %) 177 24.993 26.700 19.080 
%INST (IN %) 177 17.366 11.700 16.717 
#BLOCK 177 2.051 2.000 1.354 
#INST 177 1.644 1.000 1.337 
TENURE CEO 154 9.292 7.000 9.172 
CEO CHANGE 177 0.096 0.000 0.295 
CEO AGE 177 55.474 53.000 8.752 
Panel C- Target countries’ governance characteristics 
CIVIL 177 0.085 0.000 0.279 
LAW AND ORDER 175 5.771 6.000 0.860 
CORRUPTION 175 3.994 4.000 0.520 
EC 175 9.017 9.000 0.638 
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TABLE 3-LONG RUN PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRERS  
This table reports the three-year Buy and Hold returns (BHR 3yr) and the three-year abnormal returns (adjusted for market returns 
over three years) (BHAR 3yr), for the whole sample as well as for the subsamples of foreign and domestic acquisitions, and for 
focusing and diversifying transactions. The p-values for the test of difference are obtained with a t-test (for mean equality) and a 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (for median equality). a, b, and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 BHR 3yr BHAR 3yr 
Panel A- Acquirers’ long run performance 
Mean  
Median  
N 
0.842 
0.884 
177 
0.573 
0.502 
177 
Panel B- Acquirers’ long run performance by target origin 
 
Domestic 
targets 
Foreign 
targets 
P-value 
for test of 
difference 
Domestic 
targets 
Foreign 
targets 
P-value 
for test of 
difference 
Mean  0.890 0.608 0.080c 0.631 0.285 0.034b 
Median  0.944 0.385 0.081c 0.547 0.264 0.108 
N 147 30  147 30  
Panel C- Acquirers’ long run performance by type of transaction 
 Focusing 
transactions 
Diversifying 
transactions 
P-value 
for test of 
difference
Focusing 
transactions
Diversifying 
transactions 
P-value 
for test of 
difference
Mean  1.047 0.625 0.001a 0.763 0.371 0.011b 
Median  1.110 0.391 0.000a 0.826 0.332 0.006a 
N 91 86  91 86  
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TABLE 4- UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This table reports univariate results for the subsamples of foreign and domestic acquisitions and for focusing and diversifying 
transactions based on variables related to the deal characteristics (type of transaction (i.e., merger or tender offer), frequent 
acquirer, % acquired), to the target’s external governance characteristics (law and order, corruption, enforcement of contracts, 
legal origin), and to the bidder’s internal governance characteristics (Board size, % of independent directors sitting on the board 
% of new nominees on the board, % of shares held by the CEO, % of shares held by block-holders, % of shares held by 
institutions as well as the tenure of the CEO and the change of CEO). For a detailed description of the variables, please refer to 
Table 6. Tests of difference in means and statistical significance between both sub samples appear in the last column. a , b and c 
refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A- Univariate analysis according to the target origin 
Variable Foreign targets (1) Domestic targets (2) p-value of mean difference (1 vs 2) 
MERGER 0.000 0.116  
CIVIL 0.500 0.000  
COMMON 0.500 1.000  
LAW AND ORDER 4.571 6.000 0.000a 
CORRUPTION 3.964 4.000 0.887 
EC 9.786 8.871 0.000a 
FREQA 2.667 6.925 0.000a 
%ACQ 0.880 0.964 0.044b 
BODSZ 14.400 10.463 0.000a 
%INDD 0.473 0.421 0.172 
%RENEW 0.078 0.098 0.247 
%CEO (IN %) 3.887 7.077 0.195 
%BLOCK (IN %) 18.138 26.393 0.026b 
%INST (IN %) 11.814 18.499 0.042b 
TENURE CEO 13.300 7.238 0.017b 
CEO CHANGE 0.033 0.109 0.077c 
Panel B- Univariate analysis according to the type of transaction 
Variable Focusing transactions (1) 
Diversifying 
transactions (2) 
p-value of mean 
difference (1 vs 2) 
MERGER 0.099 0.093 0.895 
CIVIL 0.044 0.128 0.048b 
COMMON 0.956 0.872 0.048b 
LAW AND ORDER 5.967 5.559 0.003a 
CORRUPTION 4.055 3.928 0.114 
EC 8.945 9.095 0.117 
FREQA 7.758 4.558 0.000a 
%ACQ 96.122 93.732 0.320 
BODSZ 10.967 11.302 0.465 
%INDD 0.403 0.457 0.053c 
%RENEW 0.0959 0.093 0.895 
%CEO (IN %) 5.853 7.259 0.460 
%BLOCK (IN %) 21.961 28.202 0.031b 
%INST (IN %) 15.329 19.521 0.099c 
TENURE CEO 6.439 10.198 0.006a 
CEO CHANGE 0.121 0.070 0.248 
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TABLE 5- MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This table reports our multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the three-year BHAR of our sample of acquiring firms. The 
independent variables are %ACQ (% acquired), MERGER (equals one if the transaction is a merger), FOREIGN ( equals one if 
cross border transaction), FREQA (number of transactions during the same year), AGENCY (equals one if target is an insurance 
agency or broker), FOCUS (equals one if bidder and target have the same 4-digit SIC code), EC (enforceability of contracts), 
INDEX (index of investor legal protection), %INDD (% of independent directors on the board), %RENEW (% of new nominees 
on the board), %INST, %BLOCK and %CEO ( % of shares held by institutions, block-holders and the CEO, respectively), 
INDCEO (equals one if CEO is COB) and TENURE CEO (tenure of CEO as CEO). a , b and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% levels respectively. All coefficients are adjusted for heterosckedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Transactions characteristics 
CONS -0.266 
(0.487) 
-3.561 
(0.003)a  
-1.906 
(0.010)a 
-2.670 
(0.011)b 
-1.052 
(0.182) 
-3.139 
(0.003)a 
-1.395 
(0.071)c 
-2.771 
(0.008)a 
-1.755 
(0.027)b 
%ACQ 0.004 
(0.340) 
0.003 
(0.480) 
0.003 
(0.480) 
0.003 
(0.373) 
0.003 
(0.417) 
0.005 
(0.176) 
0.005 
(0.184) 
0.003 
(0.407) 
0.003 
(0.453) 
MERGER -0.576 
(0.010)a 
-0.587 
(0.005)a 
-0.577 
(0.009)a 
-0.557 
(0.010)a 
-0.542 
(0.014)b 
-0.614 
(0.007)a 
-0.604 
(0.009)a 
-0.612 
(0.013)b 
-0.600 
(0.017)b 
FOREIGN -0.040 
(0.809) 
-0.430 
(0.104) 
-0.021 
(0.904) 
-0.460 
(0.041)b 
-0.076 
(0.660) 
-0.378 
(0.111) 
-0.019 
(0.914) 
-0.325 
(0.217) 
-0.029 
(0.875) 
FREQA 0.069 
(0.000)a 
0.063 
(0.000)a 
0.068 
(0.000)a 
0.041 
(0.000)a 
0.045 
(0.000)a 
0.043 
(0.000)a 
0.047 
(0.000)a 
0.054 
(0.000)a 
0.059 
(0.000)a 
AGENCY 0.129 
(0.446) 
0.152 
(0.362) 
0.148 
(0.407) 
0.114 
(0.459) 
0.114 
(0.486) 
0.089 
(0.581) 
0.083 
(0.630) 
0.078 
(0.643) 
0.080 
(0.651) 
FOCUS 0.090 
(0.591) 
0.121 
(0.454) 
0.059 
(0.735) 
0.073 
(0.628) 
0.080 
(0.961) 
0.130 
(0.400) 
0.072 
(0.664) 
0.089 
(0.591) 
0.026 
(0.882) 
Shareholders protection 
INDEX   0.093 
(0.007)a 
 0.088 
(0.008)a 
 0.083 
(0.011)b 
 0.098 
(0.000)a 
EC  0.383 
(0.008)a 
 0.367 
(0.002)a 
 0.375 
(0.002)a 
 0.323 
(0.006)a 
 
Board characteristics 
%INDD    -1.367 
(0.001)a 
-1.329 
(0.001)a 
-1.423 
(0.001)a 
-1.392 
(0.002)a 
-1.132 
(0.005)a 
-1.087 
(0.008)a 
%RENEW    1.780 
(0.001)a 
1.794 
(0.001)a 
1.955 
(0.000)a 
1.990 
(0.000)a 
2.448 
(0.000)a 
2.444 
(0.000)a 
Ownership structure 
%INST 
(IN %) 
     -0.001 
(0.901) 
-0.001 
(0.905) 
  
%BLOCK 
(IN %) 
   -0.008 
(0.026)b 
-0.008 
(0.019)b 
    
CEO characteristics 
%CEO        -1.259 
(0.000)a 
-1.431 
(0.001)a 
INDCEO        0.172 
(0.268) 
0.158 
(0.314) 
TENURE 
CEO 
       0.001 
(0.896) 
0.003 
(0.631) 
N 177 175 175 175 175 175 175 152 152 
R 
squared 
0.296 0.334 0.309 0.465 0.442 0.450 0.424 0.502 0.514 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 6- VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
This table provides the description of the variables used in the analysis and their respective data sources. 
 
Variable Description and data sources 
FOREIGN Dummy that is equal to one if the target is not US (SDC and Factiva) 
MERGER Dummy that is equal to one if the transactions is a merger (SDC) 
FOCUS Dummy that is equal to one if the target and the bidder have the same 4 digit 
SIC code (SDC) 
CASH Dummy that is equal to one if the transaction is paid with cash only (SDC) 
STOCK Dummy that is equal to one if the transaction is paid with stock only (SDC) 
MIX Dummy that is equal to one if the transaction is paid with a mix of stock and 
cash (SDC) 
% ACQ Percentage of shares acquired during the transaction (SDC) 
CONTROL Dummy that is equal to one if the transaction involves a change in control 
(SDC) 
DEAL VALUE Deal value in millions of dollars (SDC) 
PUBLIC Dummy variable that is equal to one if the target is public (SDC, Factiva and 
proxy statements) 
AGENCY Dummy that is equal to one if the target is an agency or broker rather than a 
company or a holding company (SDC, Factiva and proxy statements) 
FREQA Number of transactions realized by the bidder during the year (SDC) 
BODSZ The number of directors sitting on the board (proxy statements) 
%INDD % of independent directors sitting on the board (proxy statements) 
INDCEO Dummy that is equal to one if the CEO is also the chief of the board (COB) 
(proxy statements) 
%NEWNOM (%) of nominees on the board (proxy statements) 
%RENEW  (%) of new members elected on the board (proxy statements) 
% CEO Share ownership by the CEO (proxy statements) 
% (#)BLOCK Share ownership by (number of) block holders (proxy statements) 
% (#)INST Share ownership by (number of) institutional investors (proxy statements) 
TENURE CEO Tenure of the CEO as the CEO (proxy statements) 
CEOCHANGE Dummy that is equal to one if there is a change of the CEO (proxy statements) 
CEO AGE Age of the CEO (proxy statements) 
CIVIL  Dummy that is equal to one for civil law countries (ICRG) 
LAW AND ORDER Measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the popular 
observance of the law. Higher values imply a better legal environment (ICRG) 
CORRUPTION Inverse measure of perceived corruption within the political system. Higher 
values imply a lower corruption environment (ICRG) 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS (EC) Measures the extent of respect of contractual agreements. Higher values imply 
higher respect of arrangements (ICRG) 
INDEX OF INVESTOR PROTECTION Equals the sum of Law and Order, Corruption and EC (ICRG and authors’ 
calculations) 
RETURNS CRSP 
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TABLE 7- ROBUSTNESS CHECK: CONTROL FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS 
This table reports our multivariate analysis when we control for subsequent transactions made by the bidder. The dependent 
variable is the three-year BHAR of our sample of acquiring firms. The independent variables are %ACQ (% acquired), MERGER 
(equals one if the transaction is a merger), FOREIGN ( equals one if cross border transaction), FREQA (number of transactions 
during the same year), AGENCY (equals one if target is an insurance agency or broker), FOCUS (equals one if bidder and target 
have the same 4-digit SIC code), EC (enforceability of contracts), SABSEQUENT ( equals one if the bidder makes an additional 
M&A during the 3 years following the announcement), INDEX (index of investor legal protection), %INDD (% of independent 
directors on the board), %RENEW (% of new nominees on the board), %INST, %BLOCK and %CEO ( % of shares held by 
institutions, block-holders and the CEO, respectively), INDCEO (equals one if CEO is COB) and TENURE CEO (tenure of CEO 
as CEO). ). a, b, and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. All coefficients are adjusted for 
heterosckedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Transactions characteristics 
CONS -0.407 
(0.320) 
-3.760 
(0.003)a 
-2.167 
(0.005)a 
-2.811 
(0.013)b 
-1.217 
(0.165) 
-3.343 
(0.003)a 
-1.661 
(0.046)b 
-2.838 
(0.010)a 
-1.839 
(0.034)b 
%ACQ 0.003 
(0.386) 
0.002 
(0.557) 
0.002 
(0.570) 
0.003 
(0.395) 
0.003 
(0.443) 
0.005 
(0.216) 
0.005 
(0.232) 
0.003 
(0.418) 
0.003 
(0.476) 
MERGER -0.581 
(0.009)a 
-0.594 
(0.005)a 
-0.584 
(0.008)a 
-0.564 
(0.010)a 
-0.548 
(0.014)b 
-0.619 
(0.007)a 
-0.608 
(0.010)a 
-0.616 
(0.012)b 
-0.606 
(0.016)b 
FOREIGN -0.054 
(0.742) 
-0.460 
(0.086)c 
-0.046 
(0.795) 
-0.469 
(0.037)b 
-0.083 
(0.630) 
-0.403 
(0.088)c 
-0.020 
(0.991) 
-0.333 
(0.207) 
-0.022 
(0.907) 
FREQA 0.067 
(0.000)a 
0.061 
(0.000)a 
0.065 
(0.000)a 
0.040 
(0.000)a 
0.044 
(0.000)a 
0.041 
(0.000)a 
0.045 
(0.000)a 
0.056 
(0.000)a 
0.058 
(0.000)a 
AGENCY 0.130 
(0.443) 
0.148 
(0.375) 
0.144 
(0.416) 
0.111 
(0.472) 
0.111 
(0.497) 
0.085 
(0.595) 
0.081 
(0.639) 
0.078 
(0.642) 
0.082 
(0.649) 
FOCUS 0.064 
(0.713) 
0.096 
(0.566) 
0.029 
(0.872) 
0.064 
(0.682) 
-0.003 
(0.985) 
0.107 
(0.507) 
0.046 
(0.792) 
0.084 
(0.625) 
0.019 
(0.915) 
SABSEQUENT 0.220 
(0.303) 
0.259 
(0.236) 
0.275 
(0.231) 
0.135 
(0.578) 
0.141 
(0.575) 
0.245 
(0.303) 
0.260 
(0.300) 
0.060 
(0.806) 
0.069 
(0.783) 
Shareholders protection 
INDEX   0.098 
(0.004)a 
 0.091 
(0.006)a 
 0.088 
(0.007)a 
 0.100 
(0.004)a 
EC  0.388 
(0.008)a 
 0.370 
(0.002)a 
 0.379 
(0.002)a 
 0.325 
(0.006)a 
 
Board characteristics 
%INDD    -1.356 
(0.001)a 
-1.316 
(0.001)a 
-1.400 
(0.002)a 
-1.366 
(0.003)a 
-1.119 
(0.007)a 
-1.072 
(0.010)a 
%RENEW    1.813 
(0.001)a 
1.829 
(0.001)a 
1.999 
(0.000)a 
2.035 
(0.000)a 
2.463 
(0.000)a 
2.461 
(0.000)a 
Ownership structure 
%INST (IN 
%) 
     -0.000 
(0.942) 
-0.000 
(0.944) 
  
%BLOCK (IN 
%) 
   -0.007 
(0.060)c 
-0.008 
(0.045)b 
    
CEO characteristics 
%CEO        -1.214 
(0.007)a 
-1.381 
(0.005)a 
INDCEO        0.174 
(0.263) 
0.161 
(0.308) 
TENURE 
CEO 
       0.001 
(0.867) 
0.003 
(0.604) 
N 177 175 175 175 175 175 175 152 152 
R squared 0.299 0.339 0.314 0.446 0.443 0.453 0.428 0.526 0.514 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 8- ROBUSTNESS CHECK: CONTROL FOR A CEO CHANGE 
This table reports our multivariate analysis when we control for a CEO change after the transaction. The dependent variable is the 
three-year BHAR of our sample of acquiring firms. The independent variables are %ACQ (% acquired), MERGER (equals one if 
the transaction is a merger), FOREIGN ( equals one if cross border transaction), FREQA (number of transactions during the same 
year), AGENCY (equals one if target is an insurance agency or broker), FOCUS (equals one if bidder and target have the same 4-
digit SIC code), EC (enforceability of contracts), INDEX (index of investor legal protection), %INDD (% of independent 
directors on the board), %RENEW (% of new nominees on the board), %INST, %BLOCK and %CEO ( % of shares held by 
institutions, block-holders and the CEO, respectively), INDCEO (equals one if CEO is COB), TENURE CEO (tenure of CEO as 
CEO) and CEO CHANGE (equals one if there is a CEO change during the year). a , b and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively. All coefficients are adjusted for heterosckedasticity. 
 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Transactions Characteristics 
CONS -2.703 
(0.013)b 
-1.052 
(0.185) 
-3.191 
(0.004)a 
-1.400 
(0.073)c 
-2.778 
(0.010)a 
-1.736 
(0.033)b 
%ACQ 0.003 
(0.375) 
0.003 
(0.418) 
0.005 
(0.178) 
0.005 
(0.186) 
0.003 
(0.498) 
0.003 
(0.536) 
MERGER -0.564 
(0.010)a 
-0.542 
(0.016)b 
-0.624 
(0.007)a 
-0.606 
(0.010)a 
-0.605 
(0.013)b 
-0.595 
(0.018)b 
FOREIGN -0.470 
(0.044)b 
-0.076 
(0.663) 
-0.391 
(0.109) 
-0.018 
(0.919) 
-0.342 
(0.200) 
-0.026 
(0.889) 
FREQA 0.040 
(0.000)a 
0.045 
(0.000)a 
0.042 
(0.000)a 
0.047 
(0.000)a 
0.053 
(0.000)a 
0.058 
(0.000)a 
AGENCY 0.115 
(0.459) 
0.114 
(0.488) 
0.088 
(0.584) 
0.083 
(0.631) 
0.066 
(0.693) 
0.071 
(0.691) 
FOCUS 0.077 
(0.615) 
0.080 
(0.962) 
0.137 
(0.385) 
0.074 
(0.662) 
0.082 
(0.616) 
0.018 
(0.918) 
Shareholders protection 
INDEX  0.088 
(0.009)a 
 0.084 
(0.013)b 
 0.102 
(0.003)a 
EC 0.373 
(0.002)a 
 0.384 
(0.003)a 
 0.336 
(0.006)a 
 
Board characteristics 
%INDD -1.389 
(0.001)a 
-1.329 
(0.001)a 
-1.469 
(0.002)a 
-1.406 
(0.004)a 
-1.156 
(0.004)a 
-1.107 
(0.006)a 
%RENEW 1.775 
(0.001)a 
1.794 
(0.001)a 
1.953 
(0.000)a 
1.989 
(0.000)a 
2.447 
(0.000)a 
2.444 
(0.000)a 
Ownership structure       
%INST (IN %)   -0.000 
(0.983) 
-0.000 
(0.935) 
  
%BLOCK (IN %) -0.007 
(0.031)b 
-0.008 
(0.021)b 
    
CEO Characteristics       
%CEO     -1.254 
(0.000)a 
-1.434 
(0.000)a 
INDCEO     0.163 
(0.306) 
0.151 
(0.351) 
TENURE CEO     -0.001 
(0.888) 
0.002 
(0.800) 
CEO CHANGE -0.067 
(0.757) 
0.001 
(0.997) 
-0.107 
(0.637) 
-0.035 
(0.878) 
-0.265 
(0.384) 
-0.228 
(0.469) 
N 175 175 175 175 152 152 
R squared 0.466 0.442 0.450 0.424 0.529 0.516 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 9- ROBUSTNESS CHECK: NUMBER OF STAKEHOLDERS 
This table reports our multivariate analysis when we control for the number of stakeholders. The dependent variable is the three-
year BHAR of our sample of acquiring firms. The independent variables are %ACQ (% acquired), MERGER (equals one if the 
transaction is a merger), FOREIGN (equals one if cross border transaction), FREQA (number of transactions during the same 
year), AGENCY (equals one if target is an insurance agency or broker), FOCUS (equals one if bidder and target have the same 4-
digit SIC code), EC (enforceability of contracts), INDEX (index of investor legal protection), %INDD (% of independent 
directors on the board), %RENEW (% of new nominees on the board), # NON INSIDER BLOCK , #BLOCK and #INST are (number 
of shares held by non insider blockholders, block-holders and institutions, respectively. a, b, and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% levels respectively. All coefficients are adjusted for heterosckedasticity. 
 
 (4) (5) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Transactions characteristics 
CONS -2.967 
(0.007)a 
-1.274 
(0.107) 
-3.324 
(0.002)a 
-1.559 
(0.044)b 
-3.272 
(0.003)a 
-1.435 
(0.066)c 
%ACQ 0.005 
(0.182) 
0.005 
(0.193) 
0.006 
(0.144) 
0.006 
(0.156) 
0.006 
(0.155) 
0.006 
(0.170) 
MERGER -0.598 
(0.007)a 
-0.585 
(0.009)a 
-0.629 
(0.008)a 
-0.618 
(0.012)b 
-0.604 
(0.009)a 
-0.596 
(0.012)b 
FOREIGN -0.421 
(0.074)c 
-0.036 
(0.842) 
-0.302 
(0.189) 
-0.092 
(0.581) 
-0.328 
(0.173) 
-0.057 
(0.755) 
FREQA 0.041 
(0.000)a 
0.046 
(0.000)a 
0.047 
(0.000)a 
0.052 
(0.000)a 
0.045 
(0.000)a 
0.049 
(0.000)a 
AGENCY 0.100 
(0.524) 
0.099 
(0.560) 
0.066 
(0.693) 
0.060 
(0.737) 
0.084 
(0.610) 
0.078 
(0.657) 
FOCUS 0.108 
(0.491) 
0.045 
(0.790) 
0.166 
(0.300) 
0.109 
(0.528) 
0.141 
(0.373) 
0.083 
(0.628) 
Shareholders protection 
INDEX  0.085 
(0.009)a 
 0.081 
(0.012)b 
 0.079 
(0.015)b 
EC 0.371 
(0.002)a 
 0.373 
(0.002)a 
 0.375 
(0.002)a 
 
Board characteristics 
%INDD -1.397 
(0.001)a 
-1.359 
(0.001)a 
-1.533 
(0.000)a 
-1.502 
(0.001)a 
-1.501 
(0.001)a 
-1.454 
(0.001)a 
%RENEW 1.885 
(0.000)a 
1.904 
(0.000)a 
2.077 
(0.000)a 
2.111 
(0.000)a 
2.026 
(0.000)a 
2.046 
(0.000)a 
Ownership structure 
# NON INSIDER 
BLOCK 
  0.089 
(0.203) 
0.089 
(0.219) 
  
#BLOCK  -0.052 
(0.379) 
-0.061 
(0.301) 
    
#INST     0.041 
(0.554) 
0.030 
(0.669) 
N 175 175 175 175 175 175 
R squared 0.453 0.429 0.460 0.433 0.452 0.425 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 10- ROBUSTNESS CHECK: CONTROL FOR PRIVATE/PUBLIC STATUS OF TARGETS 
This table reports our multivariate analysis when we control for the status of the target firm. The dependent variable is the three-
year BHAR of our sample of acquiring firms. The independent variables are %ACQ (% acquired), MERGER (equals one if the 
transaction is a merger), FOREIGN ( equals one if cross border transaction), FREQA (number of transactions during the same 
year), AGENCY (equals one if target is an insurance agency or broker), FOCUS (equals one if bidder and target have the same 4-
digit SIC code), PUBLIC (equals one if the target is a publicly traded firm), EC (enforceability of contracts), INDEX (index of 
investor legal protection), %INDD (% of independent directors on the board), %RENEW (% of new nominees on the board), 
%INST, %BLOCK and %CEO ( % of shares held by institutions, block-holders and the CEO, respectively), INDCEO (equals one 
if CEO is COB) and TENURE CEO (tenure of CEO as CEO). a , b and c refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. All coefficients are adjusted for heterosckedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Transactions characteristics 
CONS -0.324 
(0.410) 
-3.638 
(0.003)a 
-1.906 
(0.010)a 
-2.785 
(0.009)a 
-1.057 
(0.182) 
-3.271 
(0.002)a 
-1.400 
(0.072)c 
-2.903 
(0.004)a 
-1.671 
(0.034)b 
%ACQ 0.004 
(0.293) 
0.003 
(0.417) 
0.003 
(0.454) 
0.004 
(0.306) 
0.003 
(0.378) 
0.006 
(0.140) 
0.006 
(0.165) 
0.004 
(0.289) 
0.004 
(0.363) 
MERGER -0.630 
(0.013)b 
-0.649 
(0.007)a 
-0.603 
(0.015)b 
-0.642 
(0.005)a 
-0.590 
(0.011)b 
-0.712 
(0.003)a 
-0.669 
(0.007)a 
-0.750 
(0.002)a 
-0.694 
(0.007)a 
FOREIGN -0.032 
(0.846) 
-0.422 
(0.111) 
-0.018 
(0.919) 
-0.447 
(0.048)b 
-0.069 
(0.694) 
-0.359 
(0.134) 
-0.031 
(0.862) 
-0.279 
(0.295) 
-0.063 
(0.750) 
FREQA 0.070 
(0.000)a 
0.064 
(0.000)a 
0.068 
(0.000)a 
0.042 
(0.000)a 
0.046 
(0.000)a 
0.044 
(0.000)a 
0.049 
(0.000)a 
0.056 
(0.000)a 
0.088 
(0.011)b 
AGENCY 0.140 
(0.416) 
0.164 
(0.332) 
0.152 
(0.399) 
0.131 
(0.409) 
0.122 
(0.465) 
0.106 
(0.517) 
0.093 
(0.595) 
0.101 
(0.547) 
0.092 
(0.606) 
FOCUS 0.093 
(0.582) 
0.125 
(0.444) 
0.061 
(0.727) 
0.079 
(0.600) 
0.013 
(0.937) 
0.138 
(0.373) 
0.079 
(0.634) 
0.099 
(0.548) 
0.039 
(0.823) 
PUBLIC 0.107 
(0.620) 
0.121 
(0.573) 
0.050 
(0.818) 
0.164 
(0.404) 
0.094 
(0.635) 
0.194 
(0.365) 
0.130 
(0.550) 
0.297 
(0.163) 
0.211 
(0.345) 
Shareholders protection 
INDEX   0.091 
(0.008)a 
 0.085 
(0.011)b 
 0.079 
(0.019)b 
  
EC  0.384 
(0.007)a 
 0.369 
(0.002)a 
 0.376 
(0.002)a 
 0.322 
(0.005)a 
 
Board characteristics 
%INDD    -1.374 
(0.001)a 
-1.333 
(0.001)a 
-1.443 
(0.002)a 
-1.407 
(0.003)a 
-1.119 
(0.006)a 
-1.073 
(0.009)a 
%RENEW    1.810 
(0.001)a 
1.813 
(0.001)a 
1.996 
(0.000)a 
2.018 
(0.000)a 
2.515 
(0.000)a 
2.494 
(0.000)a 
Ownership structure 
%INST (IN %)      -0.000 
(0.994) 
-0.000 
(0.969) 
  
%BLOCK (IN %)    -0.007 
(0.031)b 
-0.008 
(0.022)b 
    
CEO characteristics 
%CEO        -1.187 
(0.001)a 
-1.350 
(0.001)a 
INDCEO        0.153 
(0.324) 
0.137 
(0.391) 
TENURE CEO        -0.001 
(0.811) 
0.001 
(0.856) 
N 177 175 175 175 175 175 175 152 152 
R squared 0.296 0.335 0.310 0.467 0.443 0.452 0.425 0.534 0.517 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 35
